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Comment: The Place of Death in the
Quality of Life
Paul R. Rosenbaum
1. MISTAKING AN OUTCOME FOR A COVARIATE

Donald Rubin’s lucid discussion of censoring by
death comments on several issues: he warns against
mistakes, describes obstacles to inference that might
be surmounted within a given investigation, and discusses barriers to inference that direct attention to
new data from outside the current investigation. Censoring by death creates outcomes that are defined
only contingently, such as quality of life defined
only for survivors. If the contingency is an outcome
of treatment—if survival could be affected by the
treatment—then, as Rubin demonstrates, it is a serious analytical mistake to act as if the contingency were
a covariate, a variable unaffected by treatment, when
studying the effect of the treatment on the contingently
defined outcome. This is one instance of a family of
interlinked errors in which an analysis uses an outcome of treatment as if it were a covariate measured
before treatment. Other instances in this same family
are adjusting for an outcome as if it were a covariate (Rosenbaum, 1984), or attempting to define an interaction effect between a treatment and an outcome
of treatment (Rosenbaum, 2004). One of the several
advantages of defining outcomes of treatment as comparisons of potential responses under alternative treatments (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974) is that it becomes
difficult to make these mistakes: outcomes exist in several versions depending upon the treatment, whereas
covariates exist in a single version.
Figure 1 depicts the mistake Rubin warns against. It
is a simulated randomized experiment, with N = 650
subjects, of whom n = 325 were randomized to treatment where 16 died, and m = 325 were randomized to
control, where 111 died, and Figure 1 depicts quality of
life scores for survivors. Beginning with the structure
as Rubin develops it, I will propose a somewhat different analysis. In Section 2 notation describes a completely randomized experiment of the type depicted
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in Figure 1, with censoring by death but without covariates; then Section 3 proposes a method of analysis
that separates empirical evidence of treatment effect
from diverging patient preference orderings of death
and various qualities of life.
2. CENSORING BY DEATH IN A COMPLETELY
RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT

There is a finite population of N subjects, i =
1, . . . , N , who have given informed consent to be randomized to receive either the treatment condition or
the control condition, where subject i would exhibit
response rT i under treatment or response rCi under
control. Write R for {(rT i , rCi ), i = 1, . . . , N} for the
potential responses of the N subjects, which are fixed
features of the finite population of N subjects. Of the N
subjects, a fixed number, n, with 1 ≤ n < N , are picked
at random for treatment, denoted Zi = 1, the remaining
m =
N − n receiving control,
denoted Zi = 0, so that
N 
Z
,
and
all
possible
treatment assignn= N
i=1 i
n
T
ments Z = (Z1 , . . . , ZN ) have the same probability
N −1
. The response, Ri , actually observed from i is
n
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rT i if Zi = 1 or rCi if Zi = 0, and the observed data
are O = {(Ri , Zi ), i = 1, . . . , N}. Here R is fixed but
O is random, and the distribution of O is created from
R by the known probability distribution used in the
random assignment of treatments. The task of inference in a completely randomized experiment is to say
something about the effects caused by the treatment,
R, from the observed data, O, and the known distribution of treatment assignments. This commonplace
description of a randomized experiment is found, for
instance, in Welch (1937), and it merged certain ideas
from Fisher (1935) about randomization inference and
certain ideas from Neyman (1923) about treatment effects.
Following Rubin’s approach, I will understand “censoring by death” to mean that the response is a numerical measure of “quality of life” at a particular time,
say a year, after treatment, taking values in a subset Q
of the real line, but the measure is not defined if the
subject has “died” before that time, in which case the
letter “D” appears in place of the numerical measure,
so (rT i , rCi ) could be a pair of numbers, a D paired
with a number, a number paired with a D, or a pair of
D’s. The mistake mentioned in Section 1 consists in
setting aside the D’s when studying quality of life, and
as Rubin’s discussion makes very clear, setting aside
the deaths means not estimating the effects of the treatment on quality of life.
It is sometimes the case that deaths can be compared
ordinally to various qualities of life, even though numerical comparisons are not possible; that is, Q ∪ {D}
may be a totally ordered set, with strict inequality ≺
and with equality-or-inequality , but the elements of
Q ∪ {D} cannot be manipulated arithmetically to yield
averages or expected values. One common view, perhaps the default view, might order death as inferior to
any quality of life, and that view might have such diverse sources as religious teachings or the very different observation that a living person can end his or her
life, so remaining alive with a given quality of life reveals a preference for that quality of life over death.
This common or default view is, no doubt, not universally held, and a particular person might order death
or D as preferable to the lowest or worst qualities of
life in Q. The analysis that I will describe can accommodate any total ordering of Q ∪ {D}; it need not
place D below all of Q. Faced with diverse preferences among different patients, one can carry out the
proposed analysis with several different placements of
D in Q ∪ {D}, in which case the empirical results of

a single experiment might speak differently to different patients, and each patient could select the analysis that corresponds to that patient’s own evaluation.
This is illustrated in Section 3. When a total ordering
of Q ∪ {D} is possible, to what extent does it facilitate inferences about the effects caused by treatments?
More abstractly, what can be said about treatment effects when outcomes take values in a totally ordered
set that lacks algebraic operations?
3. THE QUALITY OF LIFE AMID DEATH

In the randomized experiment, we observe n of the
N potential responses to treatment and we do not observe m of the N potential responses to treatment, and
we observe m of the N potential responses to control,
but we do not observe n of the N potential responses
to control. Let RT (1)  RT (2)  · · ·  RT (n) denote
the ordered, observed responses to treatment, including the D’s, for the n treated subjects, Zi = 1, and let
T (1)  R
T (2)  · · ·  R
T (m) denote the unobserved,
R
ordered responses to treatment for the m control subjects, Zi = 0. In Figure 1, there are 16 D’s observed
in the treated group, so 16 of the RT (i) ’s are D’s,
and if deaths are placed below any quality of life by
, then the RT (1) = · · · = RT (16) = D. Similarly, let
RC(1)  RC(2)  · · ·  RC(m) denote the ordered, observed responses to control for the m control subjects,
C(1)  R
C(2)  · · ·  R
C(n) denote
Zi = 0, and let R
the ordered, unobserved responses to control for the n
treated subjects, Zi = 1. Note that, although R is fixed,
T (j ) , RC(k) and R
C() are random variables
the RT (i) , R
with distributions created from R by random assignT (j ) , RC(k)
ment of treatments; moreover, the RT (i) , R

and RC() may be numbers in Q or the letter D.
Fix an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and consider the bivariate ranC(i) . Here, RT (i) is the
dom vector ϒ (i) = RT (i) , R
observed ith largest response of the n responses of the
C(i)
n subjects randomly assigned to treatment, and R
is the unobserved ith largest response that would have
been observed from these same n subjects had they all
received the control instead, and either coordinate of
ϒ (i) may be a D. If n were odd and i = (n + 1)/2,
C(i)  would compare the methen ϒ (i) = RT (i) , R
dian of the n observed responses, including deaths,
to treatment among n treated subjects to the median
of the n unobserved responses, including deaths, that
would have been observed among these same n treated
subjects had they all received control instead of treatment. Notice carefully that there may be no individC(i) , and the quantity
ual i with (rT i , rCi ) = RT (i) , R
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C(i) is not generally defined because either
RT (i) − R
C(i) may equal D.
RT (i) or R
C(i) is not observed, ϒ (i) too is not obBecause R
served. An exact, randomization-based confidence set
for ϒ (i) will now be defined. Recall that C(i) is a 1 − α
confidence set for an unobserved random vector ϒ (i)
if (i) C(i) is a function of the observed data, O, and
(ii) 1 − α ≤ Pr{ϒ (i) ∈ C(i) }; see Weiss (1955). Proposition 1 rephrases a result due to Fligner and Wolfe
(1976, page 83, B; 1979); see Remark 2 following the
proposition. The confidence set for ϒ (i) is the observed
C(i) formed from two of the
RT (i) and an interval for R
observed RC(j ) ’s. Notice that the interval may have one
or both endpoints as a D.

P ROPOSITION 1 (Fligner and Wolfe, 1976, 1979).
If 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ m are two integers such that
(1)

1−α=

b


m+n−i−j  i+j −1
m−j

j =a

N 

j

,

m

then C(i) = {RT (i) , w : w ∈ [RC(a) , RC(b) ]} is a 1 − α
confidence set for ϒ (i) .
R EMARK 2. Fligner and Wolfe (1976) derive a
prediction interval for an order statistic from a future
sample starting from i.i.d. sampling of an infinite population, but it is straightforward to derive their combinatorial result, namely their Corollary 4.1 in Fligner and
Wolfe (1976), from random assignment of treatments
in a finite population, and from this, the coverage of
their prediction interval follows. Specifically, (i) start
by assuming the N fixed, ordered responses to control are untied, rC(1) ≺ rC(2) ≺ · · · ≺ rC(N) ; (ii) then,
m+n−i−j  i+j −1
 
of the N
m−j
j
m possible random assignments Z produce Table 1, yielding (1) in agreement
with Corollary 4.1 in Fligner and Wolfe (1976); (iii) finally, note with Fligner and Wolfe (1976, page 84) or
by other methods that ties among the rCi make the prediction interval conservative.
At first, adopt the default view, that places death or
D below all qualities of life in Q. Then, in Figure 1,
TABLE 1
Cross-classification of untied potential responses to control, rCi ,

by treatment assignment, Zi , dividing at R
C(i)

Treated
Control


≺R
C(i)


R
C(i)


R
C(i)

Total

i −1
j

1
0

n−i
m−j

n
m

there are n = m = 325 subjects in each group, and
the RT (i) = D for i = 1, . . . , 16, RC(j ) = D for i =
1, . . . , 111. With i = (n + 1)/2 = (325 + 1)/2 = 163,
the median observed response in the treated group is
RT (163) = 4.19. With a = 138, b = 189, expression (1)
equals 0.951, and [RC(a) , RC(b) ] = [3.81, 4.16], so the
95% confidence set for ϒ (i) is C(i) = {4.19, w : w ∈
[3.81, 4.16]}. This 95% confidence set excludes the
possibility that, taking account of the unequal death
rates, the median quality of life score would have been
higher for the n = 325 treated subjects had they all received the control instead, despite the appearance of
Figure 1.
Table 2 gives C(i) for i = 41, 82, 163, 244 and
285, for the eighth’s, quartiles and median. Notice
that for i = 82 for the lower quartile, the 95% confidence set contrasts the observed lower quartile in the
treated group, RT (82) = 3.49, to an interval [RC(61) ,
RC(106) ] = [D, D], so with 95% confidence the lower
quartile of the treated group would have been “death”
had all n treated subjects received control.
Consider now a hypothetical patient who views qualities of life greater than or equal to 3.5 as better than
death, but qualities below 3.5 as inferior to death.
What does the same randomized trial say to such
a hypothetical patient with these hypothetical preferences? In Figure 1, there are 66 treated patients
and no control patients with qualities below 3.5. As
a result, with this placement of D in Q ∪ {D}, the
RC(j ) are unchanged, but the RT (i) reflect the new order, with RT (i) ≺ D ≺ 3.5 for i = 1, . . . , 66, RT (i) =
D ≺ 3.5 for i = 67, . . . , 82, and D ≺ 3.5  RT (i) for
i = 83, . . . , n = 325. Then C(41) = {3.23, w : w ∈
[D, D]} where 3.23 ≺ D so, with 95% confidence, the
lower eighth is worse if all n treated subjects had received control, but C(82) = {D, w : w ∈ [D, D]} so
the lower quartiles would be the same, and the remaining three intervals in Table 2 are unchanged. With the
default order, treatment appeared superior, but with the
TABLE 2
Inference under the default order: 95% confidence
set C(i) for ϒ(i)
Quantile
Lower eighth
Lower quartile
Median
Upper quartile
Upper eighth

i

(a, b)

RT (i)

[RC(a) , RC(b) ]

41
82
163
244
285

(25, 60)
(61, 106)
(138, 189)
(221, 266)
(267, 302)

3.10
3.49
4.19
4.79
5.20

[D, D]
[D, D]
[3.81, 4.16]
[4.43, 4.94]
[4.98, 5.58]
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hypothetical order, control appears better at the lower
eighth and worse at the median.
Perhaps there is a correct placement of death, D,
amid the possible qualities of life, Q, or perhaps not.
Certain religious teachings would place D below all
of Q, but that view is not universal: Seneca (49 A.D.,
page 92), wrote: “He will live badly who does not
know how to die well.” The randomized experiment
in Section 2 provides no new insight into the proper
placement of D in Q ∪ {D}. However, for each given
placement of D in Q ∪ {D}, the experiment provides
information about how a group of n people will fare
under treatment and under control.
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